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Neoplatonism in the Liber Naturalis
and Shifā: De anima or Metaphysica
of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)

Avicenna or Ibn Sīnā was born circa 980 in Afshna, near Bukhara, in Persia.
He worked briefly for the Samanid administration, but left Bukhara, and
lived in the area of Tehran and Isfahan, where he completed the Shifā (Healing [from error]) under the patronage of the Daylamite ruler, ‘Ala’-al Dawla,
and wrote his most important Persian work, the Dānish-nāma, which contains works on logic, metaphysics, physics, and mathematics.
In the Liber Naturalis (al-Tabi’iyyat) of Avicenna, sensory thought, virtus cogitativa, is illuminated by the active intellect, intelligentia agens. Avicenna followed Alexander of Aphrodisias in defining the potential intellect,
the nous pathetikos or nous dynamei, as the material intellect, intellectus materialis, in contrast to the intelligentia or nous poietikos. The material intellect is seen as a passive substratum of ideas and as a capacity for thought, as
a pure potency in relation to act, by which intelligibles can be apprehended.
Avicenna defines the capacity to apprehend intelligibles in the anima rationalis as incorporeal, though it is a capacity of material intellect. In the Liber
Naturalis, “in man there is some substance that apprehends the intelligible
by receiving it.” Thus “the substance that is the subject of the intelligibles is
not body nor does it in any way have being because of body, it being the
power [virtus] in the body, or its form” (6.5.2).1 That substance or virtus of
the anima rationalis is eternal, to the extent that the active intellect is able to
participate in it.
For Avicenna, the potential knowing of the material intellect is actualized when intelligibles are projected onto it from the purely intellectual and
incorporeal, which is the active intellect, which is capable of abstracting intelligible forms. In the Liber Naturalis, “the cause for giving intelligible
form is nothing but the active intellect, in whose power are the principles of
abstract intelligible forms” (6.5.5). Avicenna calls the active intellect the
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giver of forms. Forms emanate from active intellect constantly and eternally,
but not as the result of any will on the part of active intellect. Forms in active
intellect are indivisible and perfect in their incorporeality, but matter is not
capable of receiving them as such, because it is not properly prepared for
them in its particularities and differentiation. Forms thus emanate as differentiated, in sequential arrangements of terms which are particular to human
discourse in discursive or cogitative knowledge.
Cogitative knowledge, connected to corporeals in sense perception, is
different from knowledge of principles or intelligibles, which requires the
participation of active intellect in actual intellect, as in the Intellectual Principle of Plotinus, in contrast to Reason Principle. Plotinus was not known to
Arab scholars by name, but parts of the Enneads were paraphrased in the
Theology of Aristotle. For Avicenna, cogitative reason is necessary to ascend
from material intellect to actual intellect, as dialectic is necessary to ascend
to intellection for Plotinus. In Avicenna this involves the stage which is
called intellectus in habitu, habitual intellect. Intellectus in habitu is described as an intellect as a state, nous kath hexin, a state of preparedness for
intellection, as in the thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Intellectus in habitu is an intellect in act, intellectus in effectu, though not
in constant act, only when turned towards active intellect. Intellectus in
habitu operates according to principles or first intelligibles, in the participation of active intellect, when the intelligible is present in it, as reflected, illuminated or emanated by active intellect, in an acquired intellect, an
intellectus accommodatus, or an intellect acquired from outside human intellect, accommodatus ab extrinsecus. The intellectus in habitu leads to an actualized intellect, which is able to separate itself from the corporeals of sense
perception and the mechanisms of material intellect. In the Liber Naturalis,
“Thus the rational soul, being in a certain kind of union with the forms, is
capable of having present in it free from all admixture the forms that come
from the light of the active intellect itself” (6.5.5).
First intelligibles lead to second intelligibles as the illumination of active
intellect is more clearly received. In this process, intellectus in habitu leads
to acquired intellect, intellect which operates according to the reflected
forms or intelligibles of active intellect into the corporeal world and material
intellect. Cogitative reason prepares the material intellect to receive the emanation of the active intellect, by allowing the intelligentia agens to correspond the sensible form with the intelligible form in perception. The sensible
form is presented by the cogitative faculty, in the retention and assimilation
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of the phantasm in the sensus communis, and this provides the substrate for
the participation of active intellect in the anima rationalis. The phantasm or
sensible form retained in memoria provides a source to which the anima rationalis can return continually for sustenance in its cogitative activities, as in
Enneads IV.3.29 of Plotinus.
The anima rationalis does not need to return to the form image, though,
and the more it develops in intellectus in habitu, the less dependent it becomes on corporeal sense perception, the less it needs to return to the image.
Once the anima rationalis has achieved actual intellect, the sensible forms
retained in the memoria are only distractions, and they should thus be ignored and excluded from the intellective process, as Avicenna describes in
the Shifā: De anima (223) or Metaphysica, because by then the actual intellect is able to understand the a priori intelligible form as the basis for the
sensible form, and its operation can become solely dependent on that which
comes from outside it, in the emanation of active intellect. For Plotinus, the
sensible forms fade away.
In the Liber Naturalis (6.5.6), knowledge of intelligible objects necessitates the ability of intellect to recall to mind the forms in phantasia, sensible
and intelligible forms, and thoughts or intentions in memoria, the two retentive functions of sense perception. Knowledge of intelligibles also necessitates the ability of intellectus in habitu to be joined with active intellect,
through emanation or illumination, in order for the intelligible thought, ipsum intellectum, to be formed, in the conjoining of the sensible and intelligible form. The intelligible thought though is not always present to intellect or
formed in intellect; it is present eternally in active intellect, but its presence
in actual intellect requires the development of intellect in intellectus in
habitu. Through development in intellectus in habitu, the anima rationalis is
able to conjoin with active intellect when it chooses to do so. When the anima rationalis is willing, the intelligible form flows into it from active intellect, in the capacity of actual or actualized intellect, made possible through
acquired intellect, intellectus adeptus or intellectus accommodatus.
Avicenna compares the relation between active intellect and material intellect to the relation between the sun and the sense of sight. In the Liber
Naturalis, “for just as the sun is actually seen through itself, and what before
was not actually visible through its light, so also the disposition of the [active] intellect is in relation to our souls” (6.5.5). Active intellect makes intelligibles visible to the anima rationalis, if the anima rationalis is turned
toward active intellect in actual intellect or acquired intellect, intellectus ac-
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commodatus. The sun is seen by its own light, while objects perceived in vision are seen by the light of the sun. For Avicenna, the material intellect is
able to see the form of the thing in the oculus mentis, by the light of the active intellect, which proceeds or emanates from a first cause and illuminates
the form of the thing as the intelligible form, in the irradiatio spiritualis, the
illumination or reflection in the anima rationalis.
In the Shifā: De anima of Avicenna, intelligibles are differentiated in the
compositive imaginative faculty, as in Enneads IV.3.29. According to Plotinus, the object of sense perception, the sensible form, is preserved in
memory as a representation, an intelligible form; the impression of the object
passes away while the representation remains present to the imagination, the
image-making faculty. For Avicenna, active intellect transforms sense perceptions into principles, which are the first intelligible thoughts. In Enneads
I.3.5, the principles are provided by the Intellectual Principle, through which
dialectic reaches intellection. In the De anima (3.7.431b2) of Aristotle, the
human intellect thinks the forms in the images, and the sensible form is given
by the intelligible form, which is formed in the imagination or phantasia and
is presented to discursive reason in the process of perception. According to
Avicenna, in the Shifā: De anima (235), the image or species is formed in the
sensus communis, and is then received by the imaginative faculty, the phantasia, which combines the images in different configurations, according to
the spatial and temporal sequencing of discursive reason in material intellect.
Discursive reason then receives an abstraction of the species from the phantasia, a representation of the intelligible form which corresponds to the sensible form.
In the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna, “The rational faculty, illuminated in
us by the light of the active intellect, considers the particulars that are in the
imagination,” and “in this way they are rendered free from matter and its appendages and are imprinted in the rational soul” (6.5.6). The active intellect
is that which illuminates, the ellampôn, while potential intellect contains
what is illuminated, the ellampomenoi, and the multiple particulars which
illuminate, the ellampontes. The illumination of the particulars frees the particulars from their corporeal dependence, in that the incorporeality of light
can participate in them, and the illumination allows the particulars to be
transposed into universals or intelligibles, as they “do not move by themselves from imagination toward our intellect.” The intelligible is not possible
without the particular, but it is not the particular which causes the intelligible, nor is it the faculty of human intelligence, which alone cannot exceed its
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corporeal mechanisms.
Because for Avicenna intelligibles cannot actually exist in the human intellect, because they are incorporeal and properties of active intellect, as Platonic archetypes, only knowledge of intelligibles can exist in human
intellect, so the illumination of active intellect is not of the intelligibles
themselves, differing from Aristotle, but of the faculty in the anima rationalis to know the intelligibles. The illumination is of the phantasia, the mechanism of the anima rationalis, and not of the potential intelligibles in
phantasia. The illumination is not of the intelligible form in the oculus mentis, but of the perception of the intelligible form in the oculus mentis, in actual or acquired intellect as active intellect participates in it through
emanation or illumination. The species does not become an intelligible in its
being transported from the compositive imagination, but rather in its being
perceived by acquired intellect, which is so disposed because it is in conjunction with active intellect through illumination, as described in the Shifā:
De anima (235–236). It is the oculus mentis rather than the species itself
which is illuminated, the flashlight rather than the object which the flashlight
makes visible.
In the Shifā: De anima (247), Avicenna compares the ability of intellect
to achieve acquired intellection through the illumination of active intellect
with the eye which has been made healthy in its vision through treatment, so
it is able to see clearly. In the Liber Naturalis, “learning for the first time is
like the healing of an eye, which, having been made healthy, can, when it
wants to, apprehend a form by looking upon some individual” (6.5.6). The
healthy eye, like the healthy anima rationalis, is able to perceive the intelligible form in the sensible form.
Avicenna also compared the ability of intellect to achieve acquired intellection to a mirror. Intellect can only achieve acquired intellection if it is
turned towards active intellect and is able to perceive reflections of intelligibles, as in a mirror. The intelligibles are not actually in intellect in the same
way that corporeal forms, or sensible bodies, are not actually in a mirror. In
Enneads IV.3.30, “the verbal expression” in discursive reason, “unfolds its
content and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power,” in the formation of the intelligible form in acquired intellect, “and so
shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it” (IV.3.30).2 Discursive reason in material intellect mirrors the intelligible in acquired intellect, the Intellectual
Principle of Plotinus, which for Avicenna is already a mirror reflection of the
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intelligible in active intellect. Thus in Enneads I.4.10, discursive reason “becomes like the reflection resting on the smooth and shining surface of a mirror.” The phantasm or sensible form exists in sense perception as a reflection
of the principia conoscendi, the intelligible form in intellection, from acquired intellect.
For Plotinus there can be no immediate sense perception of an object,
without the mediation of the mirror reflection of the intelligible form of the
object in intellect; the same can be said for Avicenna. In Enneads I.1.8, the
intelligible form in intellect becomes the sensible form in sense perception,
“not by merging into body but by giving forth, without any change in itself,
images or likenesses of itself like one face caught by many mirrors,” in the
same way that active intellect presents the intelligible to acquired intellect.
Acquired intellect is only capable of receiving the intelligible to the extent of
its limitations, as differentiated or sequentially arranged, in the same way
that the mirror is only capable of receiving an image according to its corporeal state, adjusted in size and position.
In the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna, the anima rationalis consists of five
internal senses. The sensus communis is sensory representation in the common sense, which coordinates the five external senses. The retentive imagination or phantasia preserves the sensations processed by the sensus
communis. The sensations preserved in phantasia are then processed in a
compositive imagination. Memory or memoria preserves the perceptions of
the vis aestimativa as traces or mnemic residues. The vis aestimativa or vis
existimationis is the intuitive faculty which performs sensual judgment.3 The
internal senses are also explained in the Shifā: De anima (44–45). Both the
phantasia and memoria are seen as a kind of “storehouse” for what is apprehended; phantasia stores the forms apprehended by sense perception, the
sensible form, while memoria stores the intentiones connected with the species, the capacity for discernment of intellect, apprehended by the vis aestimativa, as what might be the verbal expression of discursive reason for
Plotinus, in the formation of language.
The intentiones would correspond to the signified in language, as the
phonetic form of the word as signifier is received in sense perception as the
sensible form, and is then retained as a mnemic residue in phantasia as the
intentio, into which it has been transformed by the vis aestimativa of the actual intellect or intelligentia agens. Once the word in language has become
the intelligible form in the memoria as the intentio, once the signifier has
been connected to the signified, then intellect is able to reinsert it into the

John Hendrix

7

corporeal particulars of language in the mechanics of discursive reason, as it
is able to see it as illuminated by active intellect as signified, separated from
the corporeal. In the Liber Naturalis, “learning is nothing but the attainment
of a perfect disposition for uniting oneself with the active intellect until this
becomes a cognition that is simple,” in the unification of the signifier and
signified, sensible and intelligible form, “and from which emanate ordered
forms by virtue of the thought activity of the soul” (6.5.6). As the unified
cognitions are stored in memoria as intentiones, they will pass as a sensible
form in phantasia unless the illumination of active intellect is turned toward
them through the mechanisms of actualized intellect, through intellectus in
habitu.
In the Liber Naturalis, “That which receives is not the same as that
which preserves. The storehouse of that which is apprehended by sense is the
faculty of imagination,” phantasia, “while the storehouse for that which apprehends intentions,” thesaurus apprehendentis intentionem, “is memory”
(6.4.1). Phantasia and memoria are not active participants in intellection; the
memory traces are present in them only when they are not participating in
intellection, when the anima rationalis is not aware of them. Thus the image
“is preserved in its preserving faculty whenever the soul averts its attention
from it,” and “these preserving faculties do not apprehend,” rather, “they are
a storehouse,” and “if the apprehending or judging faculty (vis aestimativa)
of either the intellect or the soul turns towards it, then they encounter that
which is already in possession…” When the species or intentio is not playing
a role in the processes of actual intellect, it can be found in the phantasia or
memoria, in the inert substratum of potential intellect. “A storehouse is assigned to those forms that at certain times are not contemplated by the estimative faculty,” the species in phantasia, and “a storehouse is also assigned
to those intentions that, at certain times, are not considered by the estimative
faculty,” the intentiones in memoria.
When a perception is forgotten it is preserved in the phantasia or memoria, but is inaccessible to conscious thought. The forgetting of a perception is
a result of the inability of the anima rationalis to be able to receive the illumination of the active intellect, to be able to function according to higher intellectual faculties. The memory of a sensory perception is different from the
memory of an intelligible. The intelligible, in that it is indivisible, cannot be
present in a corporeal organ, or known through a physical faculty, as it cannot subsist in a divisible substratum, as explained in the Shifā: De anima
(209). Intelligibles can thus not be retained by an internal sense such as the
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phantasia or memoria, and not be present in material intellect. The intelligible is only present in active intellect, as an incorporeal; it is accessible to material intellect, and it can participate in material intellect, but material
intellect cannot participate in it. Thus for Avicenna the intelligible is more of
a Platonic archetype, existing separately from human intellect, than the Aristotelian intelligible which subsists in human intellect, to be illuminated by
active intellect. The intelligible emanates to the anima rationalis and participates in it according to the Plotinian model. The intelligible is able to participate in material intellect by acquired intellect, which allows the anima
rationalis to overcome the defects and limitations to which it is subject in its
connection to corporeality. The intelligible is eternally and consistently accessible to material intellect, but material intellect is not always capable of
receiving it, as it is subject to temporal and spatial limitations.
In the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna, active intellect and material intellect
are mediated by an intellect which is both active and potential, intellectus in
habitu, which is a state of preparedness for intellection in the participation of
active intellect. It is a precondition for knowledge of both sensibles and intelligibles in material intellect, in the connection between the anima rationalis
and the corporeal. Once the anima rationalis is separated from the corporeal,
it no longer requires the preparatory sensory potencies assimilated in the sensus communis, and is capable of union with the active intellect, insofar as it
can receive the participation of active intellect. “But when the soul is once
freed from body and from the accidents of body, it will be capable of union
with the active intellect, and in this intellect it shall find intelligible beauty
and eternal delight” (6.5.6).
In Enneads II.9.16, if the actual intellect in the anima rationalis is able to
perceive intelligible beauty in active intellect, then the anima rationalis is
able to perceive manifestations of that beauty in the sensible realm, in sense
perception, in the reflection of intelligibles. Intelligible beauty is perceived
in sensible objects “by recognizing in the objects depicted to the eyes the
presentation of what lies in the idea.” In seeing intelligible beauty in the
beauty of a body, for example, “the sight of Beauty excellently reproduced
upon a face hurries the mind to that other Sphere,” of the archetypal intelligible in active intellect, as described in the Symposium of Plato.
It is possible in Plotinus that intelligible beauty, that which is the source
of corporeal beauty, can be represented in the sensible world, or, at least, that
forms in the sensible world can suggest intelligible beauty, or the possibility
of such beauty. For Plotinus it is the contemplation of sensible forms in per-
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ception, and the consciousness of perception as distinct from the sensible
forms, and the distinction between the sensible form and the intelligible
form, as in actual intellect, which leads to the contemplation of the intelligible in sense perception. While the perception of intelligible beauty is only
possible for the anima rationalis which has been disciplined for it in intellectus in habitu, intelligible beauty is present always in every intellect as a potentiality. Intelligible beauty may be perceived in a sensible object in the
understanding in actual intellect that the beauty of a form has nothing to do
with the form itself, but with how the form corresponds to the idea of beauty,
the intelligible beauty, in the intellect.
This is illustrated by Plotinus in Enneads V.8.1 by comparing two blocks
of stone, one of which is carved into a statue by a craftsman, so that in which
“the form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters into
the stone…” The beauty of the stone preexists the stone as intelligible beauty, as the intelligible form preexists the sensible form, and the sensible beauty in the stone is just a “derivative and a minor” of that prior beauty, the
intelligible beauty, as material forms are shadows and reflections of intelligible forms. The material form of the stone, because it is tied to the corporeal, is limited as to how much it can participate in the intelligible beauty.
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